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It is a brief digression in the film Conspiracy, a historical Holocaust drama.1 
Fifteen mid-level bureaucrats sit around a conference table in a well-appointed 
Berlin lakeside villa in January of 1942, gathered to coordinate a plan for 
murdering all of Europe’s Jews. A representative of the Reich Interior Ministry 
proposes mass sterilization rather than mass murder—“we’ll pinch off the 
race at this generation,” as he puts it—because this, unlike outright genocide, 
could be done consistently with German law. A Nazi Party representative 
interrupts: “We make the law we need!” “Why am I telling you this?” he adds 
in exasperation. “How many lawyers are in this room?” he asks. “Raise your 
hands.”
Nine of the fifteen men put their hands in the air.
The conversation swiftly shifts back to genocide, and before long the focus 
is the grisly logistics and mechanics of killing. Shocking stuff. But for the law 
students screening Conspiracy as part of the law curriculum of the Fellowships 
at Auschwitz for the Study of Professional Ethics (“FASPE”),2 the most 
shattering moment is that little digression, the nine raised hands.3 
They realize: Lawyers murdered the Jews of Europe.
1. ConspiraCy (HBO Films 2001).
2. FASPE currently offers fellowship programs for students in four professional disciplines: 
law, medicine, journalism, and seminary. See http://www.faspe.info (last visited June 23, 
2014). A fifth program for business school students is being developed.
3. While the meeting that Conspiracy depicts did take place, this particular dramatic moment 
undoubtedly did not. The film is a dramatization of the discussions at Wannsee that strays 
from the historical evidence—the minutes of the meeting that Adolf Eichmann prepared 
—in order to make the meeting’s subject more intelligible and the characters of those in 
attendance more vivid. See Alan E. Steinweis, am. Hist. rev., 107 (2002) (reviewing 
ConspiraCy (2001)).
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A few days later, the FASPE fellows walk through the gate and up the 
driveway of that lakeside villa in Berlin. The movie’s exterior shots were filmed 
on location, and the grounds and façade of what is now called the House of 
the Wannsee Conference look the same today as they did seventy years ago. 
So as the fellows step through the front door, they feel as though they are 
crossing a threshold into history. They enter the meeting room and stand in 
the spot where that earlier group of lawyers ratified the terms of annihilation 
over cognac. They cannot help but see the chasm between the refined norms of 
their profession and the savagery of what that refinement produced, because 
they are standing where the chasm opened.
It gets harder. A day or two later, the FASPE fellows climb the concrete 
stairs of an Auschwitz barrack to file past a display case, easily seventy-five feet 
long, filled with two tons of human hair. The next day, at the Birkenau death 
camp, they stop at a meadow where bodies were burned in the open air when 
the crematoria were full. They listen to frogs croaking in ponds where human 
ashes were dumped.
Though they are in no shape to think about it at this particular moment, 
they surely will never be in a better position to appreciate Robert Cover’s 
observation that “[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and 
death.”4
* * *
The FASPE fellowship includes more than visits to Holocaust-related 
sites. The program intersperses these visits with sessions on legal ethics and 
the formation of professional identity. In these seminars, they are talking not 
about how lawyers facilitated genocide, but how to manage duties of candor 
and confidentiality, which case decisions a lawyer may control, and whether 
junior associates are free to resist the commands of senior partners.5 They 
are talking, in other words, about the ordinary sorts of problems they will 
encounter in their own lives as practicing lawyers. The aspiration of FASPE is 
that against the backdrop of the Holocaust and its lawyers, they will talk about 
those problems in extraordinary ways and will emerge from the fellowship 
with a deeper commitment to moral and ethical practice.
Surveys of the FASPE fellows tend to suggest that the fellowship realizes 
this aspiration. The fellows’ sense of preparedness “to confront the ethical 
issues that will arise in [their] professional practice” typically rises significantly 
between pre- and post-trip assessments.6 This marked increase in feelings 
of ethical preparedness suggest that FASPE is doing something effective—
something that may not be happening in ethics instruction within the walls of 
4. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
5. The program uses problems from lisa G. lerman & pHilip G. sCHraG, etHiCal problems 
in tHe praCtiCe of law (3d ed. 2012) and riCHard Zitrin et al., leGal etHiCs in tHe 
praCtiCe of law (3d ed. 2007). 
6. For example, in 2013, only 2 of 13 fellows rated their sense of preparedness at 8 or higher on 
a 1-to-10 scale before the trip began, while 9 of 13 did so by the trip’s end.
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US law schools.7 The FASPE program has not been rigorously evaluated to 
determine which of its components are most effective at increasing the fellows’ 
sense of preparedness to meet the ethical challenges of law practice. However, 
several components of the FASPE experience distinguish it from the ethics 
and professionalism curricula common in American law schools:
•	 FASPE immerses students in history by taking them to the physical 
sites where lawyers worked and where the consequences of their 
work unfolded. In other words, it invokes the power of place as a 
pedagogical tool.
•	 FASPE focuses on lawyers’ roles in a paradigmatically evil system. It 
does not seek to inspire fellows with stories of heroic lawyers fighting 
for justice. It unabashedly teaches by negative example.
•	 FASPE is a completely immersive, intensely personal, and often 
emotional experience. The fellows, two FASPE faculty members, 
and several FASPE staff members are together for twelve straight 
days, living and learning together in places that have known great 
human suffering. It presents an opportunity for group cohesion and 
for sustained (even unremitting) engagement that no American law 
school course could attain.
In this Essay, I explore these distinctive attributes of the FASPE law 
program.8 The third of them—its full-immersion approach—makes clear that 
FASPE is a pedagogy that cannot easily be replicated as part of the program 
of legal education in an American law school. It is very expensive,9 surely too 
expensive for an era in which most of the conversation about American legal 
education is about cutting costs.10 And yet the success of the program calls out 
for examination, if only to see whether aspects of its approach might transfer 
to a U.S. law school setting.
The Fellowships at Auschwitz for the Study of Professional Ethics are twelve-
day study experiences for professional school students in four disciplines:  law, 
medicine, journalism, and religion.11 They are administered by the Museum 
of Jewish Heritage in New York City on the strength of financial support 
from private donors. All four programs are grounded on the same idea: that 
students training in these professions can deepen their commitment to ethical 
7. According to the 2010 Law School Survey of Student Engagement (“LSSSE”), only 57 
percent of U.S. law students in their final year of study feel “very much” or “quite” prepared 
to “deal[ ] with ethical dilemmas that arise as part of law practice.” See Law School Survey 
of Student Engagement, 2010 Annual Survey Results 8 (Table 1), http://lssse.iub.edu/
pdf/2010/2010_LSSSE_Annual_Survey_Results.pdf (last visited June 23, 2014).
8. I have been a FASPE law faculty member for four years and have had a significant hand in 
the development of its curriculum.
9. The fellowship covers the costs of air and ground transportation, accommodations, food, 
and educational materials for each fellow.
10. See brian Z. tamanaHa, failinG law sCHools (2013).
11. See supra note 3. An additional program for business school students is also contemplated.
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practice by studying the roles that their professions played, in the places where 
they played them, in the Holocaust.
The law program’s curriculum presents a mix of historical study and 
discussion of current problems in legal ethics, and proceeds (with modest 
annual variations) as follows.
Pre-trip Assignments
The fellows12 are given two assignments to complete before gathering in 
New York City in late May to begin the program. First, they are asked to read 
two books and an article: an excellent, very short history of the Holocaust by 
historian Doris Bergen,13 Primo Levi’s searing Survival in Auschwitz,14 and an old 
but concise history of the German bar in the Third Reich from the American 
Journal of Legal History.15
Second, the fellows are asked to write and submit a legal memorandum in 
response to a problem based loosely on the one Richard Weisberg describes 
in his article “The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of the 
Grotesque, with a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law.”16 The problem asks the 
fellows to put themselves in the shoes of an English-trained lawyer on the 
German-occupied Isle of Jersey in 1943 and advise a Jersey government official 
on whether, under the German-imposed racial laws in force on the island at 
that time, two described island residents should or should not be deemed 
“Jews.” It comes as a shock to the fellows to see the German laws on Jews 
published in English and to learn that lawyers trained in England enforced 
them in a British Crown Dependency. The ways in which the fellows do (or 
do not) apply the laws to the facts in their memoranda become important 
touchstones for the discussion that lies ahead on the trip to Europe.
The Trip:  New York
The law fellows gather for their FASPE trip at the Museum of Jewish 
Heritage in lower Manhattan in late May.17 The program’s first two days are at 
the museum and include an ice-breaking activity, an historical overview of the 
Nazis’ rise to power, a chance to explore the museum’s exhibits and to hear the 
12. The number of fellows varies slightly from year to year but averages thirteen, and includes 
students who have completed their first, second, and third years of law school as well as an 
occasional LL.M. student. They are selected in a highly competitive application process 
from a pool of applicants that regularly exceeds two hundred.
13. doris l. berGen, war and GenoCide (2d ed. 2009).
14. primo levi, survival in ausCHwitZ (1947).
15. Kenneth Willig, The Bar in the Third Reich, 20 am. J. leGal Hist. 1 (1976).
16. 17 CardoZo l. rev. 1875 (1996).
17. Gathering at the same time and place were the fellows in the FASPE Journalism Program. 
The Law and Journalism programs travel and socialize together throughout the trip and 
visit many historical sites together but follow different curricula unique to their disciplines.
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personal narrative of a Holocaust survivor, and a screening of the film Conspiracy 
mentioned at the beginning of this essay. Seminar discussions begin with an 
exploration of the validity of some of the most commonly voiced explanations 
for the behavior of German lawyer-perpetrators: an excessive commitment 
to legal positivism and obedience to authority. Conversation focuses on 
Gustav Radbruch’s well-known formula for deviating from positivism18 and 
on Stanley Milgram’s notorious obedience experiments in New Haven in the 
early 1960s.19 A discussion of the approaches the fellows took in responding to 
the Isle of Jersey problem allows them to consider the extent to which various 
professional and situational circumstances led them to consider applying, 
undermining, or rejecting the Nazi laws defining who was a Jew.
Berlin
After two days at the museum in New York, they fly overnight to Berlin 
and immediately set out on a historical walking tour focusing on Jewish life in 
the city before and during the Nazi years. The capstone of the day is a visit to 
the somber steles of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe near the 
Brandenburg Gate and the powerful museum installed beneath the memorial.
After a good night’s sleep, the fellows spend the morning touring the 
Topography of Terror, a museum at the site of the Third Reich’s security nerve 
center that documents the Nazi bureaucracy of repression and genocide. The 
afternoon is devoted to the first of several sessions featuring group work based 
on hypothetical current-day problems in legal ethics. These problems range 
widely across the landscape of law practice. The fellows might discuss how to 
respond as a law firm associate to a partner’s demand for an unsupportable 
opinion letter, or how and whether a criminal defense lawyer should cross-
examine a truthful witness, or how to advise a corporate client about whether 
to take advantage of a costly contract drafting error by opposing counsel.
The next day in Berlin begins with a visit to the austere but haunting 
memorial at Track 17 of the Grünewald train station in an elegant residential 
district. This is the track where the majority of Berlin’s Jews were put on trains 
and deported to the east; it goes unmentioned, but is surely on everyone’s 
minds, that in a couple of days we will ourselves head east to see the depots at 
the other end of the line. The afternoon is spent at the House of the Wannsee 
Conference. After a sobering historical tour, the fellows work in small groups 
on short research projects about Nazi law and Nazi judges, and then gather 
for a full-group discussion of the career of Bernhard Lösener, the lawyer who 
manned the “Jewish Desk” at the Reich Interior Ministry from 1933 to early 
1943.20 Lösener was something of a complex figure who, on the one hand, 
18. Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, in law and morality: readinGs 
in leGal pHilosopHy 127-36 (David Dyzenhaus, et al. eds., 2007).
19. stanley milGram, obedienCe to autHority: an experimental view (1974); Arthur G. 
Miller, What Can the Milgram Obedience Experiments Tell Us about the Holocaust?, in tHe soCial 
psyCHoloGy of Good and evil  (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).
20. leGislatinG tHe HoloCaust: tHe bernHard loesener memoirs and supportinG 
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helped draft many of the key laws and regulations that isolated and persecuted 
Germany’s Jews, but, on the other hand, worked against Party pressure to 
expand the definition of who counted as a Jew and resigned his position when 
he could no longer avoid knowing that the Reich’s program had shifted to 
outright genocide. Lösener’s career provides rich fodder for consideration 
of the impact of professional ambition and of the merits and demerits of 
continuing or discontinuing representation. 
A final day in Berlin includes additional seminar sessions working through 
difficult ethical scenarios in everyday law practice. The fellows also meet with 
a German lawyer who discusses the legacy of the German bar’s complicity in 
the creation and maintenance of the Nazi legal regime for later generations of 
German lawyers and judges.21
Poland
The fellows next fly to Krakow in southern Poland. A day and a half in 
this picturesque old city center includes an historical presentation about the 
complicated story of Poland and the Jews before and during World War II, 
additional ethical-problem-based seminar sessions, and a tour of Kazimierz, 
Krakow’s erstwhile Jewish quarter.
The following two days are devoted to guided tours of the Auschwitz I and 
Birkenau camps in the town of Oswieçim. The two camp sites are strikingly 
different from each other. The smaller Auschwitz I, with its tall and well-
preserved brick barracks and its infamous “Arbeit Macht Frei” metal gate, is 
home to a somewhat outdated but nonetheless traumatizing museum display 
featuring mountains of shoes, eyeglasses, prosthetics, clothing, suitcases, and 
other remains of the Nazis’ victims. The vast Birkenau camp, where hundreds 
of thousands were gassed, was mostly destroyed at war’s end and offers 
relatively little in the way of curatorial interpretation. It has more of the feel of 
a cemetery or memorial park than Auschwitz I, which is simply an onslaught of 
horrors. The fellowship’s curriculum includes no seminar meetings or focused 
discussions of professional ethics on these days, though each day offers the 
fellows the opportunity to meet for open-ended discussion of what they have 
seen, learned, and felt.
For the final two days of the trip, the fellows return to Krakow for further 
seminar sessions. At this point in the trip, the themes that emerge have to do 
with the legacy of the tragic history they have studied. The fellows screen and 
discuss a powerful documentary film called “Inheritance,”22 which narrates 
a painful meeting at the site of the Plaszow concentration camp in Krakow 
between the daughter of the camp’s brutal commander Amon Goeth and a 
doCuments (Karl Schleunes ed., 2001).
21. In the summer of 2014, the German lawyer was law professor Bernhard Schlink, author of, 
among other things, the bestselling novel tHe reader (1997) and Guilt about tHe past 
(2010), a penetrating collection of essays exploring the continued relevance of the Nazi era 
for Germans today.
22. inHeritanCe (Allentown Productions, 2006).
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Jewish inmate of Plaszow who worked as a slave in Goeth’s home. The film 
triggers thoughtful discussion of the relevance of the Holocaust story to 
successive generations and the challenges of judgment and reconciliation. 
Another session focuses on post-war efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to justice. 
Using a chapter from David Fraser’s provocative book Law After Auschwitz,23 the 
fellows reflect on whether the Nazi legal system was fundamentally continuous 
or discontinuous with German legal systems that preceded and followed the 
Third Reich, and with the legal systems of other Western nations.24 At this late 
point in the trip, this is a crucial question. The FASPE program assumes that 
what German lawyers did and didn’t do between 1933 and 1945 can contribute 
to the professional formation of today’s young lawyers, but the nature of that 
contribution varies for each FASPE fellow at least in part as a function of 
how relevant the Nazi example seems to his or her own life. This penultimate 
session enables the fellows to address this question directly, and with the 
knowledge they have gained over ten days of travel and study.
The trip’s final seminar session looks ahead rather than to the past. Keying 
off of David Luban’s thoughtful article Integrity:  Its Causes and Cures,25 the fellows 
are asked to discuss the strategies that might be available to them to keep from 
slipping (or plunging) into unethical or—what is not quite the same—immoral 
behavior. The discussion is personal and powerful, naturally spilling over into 
broader reflection about the meaning and impact of the FASPE experience and 
of the personal relationships the fellows have built during their time together.
Post-trip Assignment
FASPE asks that upon returning from the trip, the fellows write a paper 
about legal ethics, on a topic of their choosing, to reflect their engagement 
with the themes and lessons of their fellowship experience. The range of topics 
is remarkable: papers submitted after the FASPE trip in 2013 explored the role 
of humility in pro bono work,26 the propriety of a government lawyer’s declining 
to defend an immoral law,27 the geography of the Holocaust and ethics in 
environmental law,28 and many other interesting themes.
FASPE does not purport to function as a residential law school curriculum 
in ethics or professionalism. It can only supplement, and not replace, a 
residential course or courses. It is instructive, however, to consider how FASPE 
23. david fraser, law after ausCHwitZ (2006).
24. See Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating against Catastrophe, 60 buff. l. rev. 323, 
338-43 (2011).
25. David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 fordHam l. rev. 279 (2003).
26. Kristen Bell, Learning Humility (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
27. Johnston Chen, When Defenders of the Law Choose not to Defend:   Attorney General Kane and Pennsylvania’s 
Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, 2013 Faspe J., at 25.
28. Carson Thomas, Stones Will Speak: Environmental Ethics and a Geography of the Holocaust, 2013 
Faspe J., at 29.
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fits into the evolving discourse on the pedagogy of ethics and professionalism 
in American law schools.
The question of how to teach ethics to aspiring lawyers has arisen 
episodically for decades. The Association of American Law Schools convened 
national conferences on the subject in Boulder, Colorado, in 1956 and 1968, 
and another in 1977 in Detroit.29 The topic grew somewhat pressing by the time 
of the third of these AALS gatherings, because the American Bar Association 
had recently amended its accreditation standards for law schools to require 
instruction in professional responsibility.30 The topic also shifted somewhat in 
focus over these two decades due to the rise of clinical legal education31: for the 
first time it became possible for students to study ethics experientially rather 
than through abstract lecture and dialogue in classrooms.
 The next cycle of debate about legal ethics instruction occurred in the early 
1990s, when the W.M. Keck Foundation invested nearly $5 million in grants 
over a five-year period to study and improve the teaching of legal ethics in 
American law schools.32 These grants supported considerable study of then-
current approaches to teaching legal ethics33 as well as experimentation with 
new methods. They led to the publication in 1996 of three symposium issues 
of American law reviews dedicated to canvassing and debating the results of 
the Keck-supported studies and curricular changes.34
The Keck-supported work continued the discussions that were already 
ongoing about whether the law school curriculum should situate instruction 
on legal ethics and professionalism in a single freestanding course taught in a 
conventional classroom, in an experiential course or courses in a law school’s 
clinical program, or in modules and themes pervasively embedded across 
the curriculum in courses focused on other areas of substantive law. Faculty 
members who had piloted courses and programs designed along all three of 
these broad lines published articles singing and at least loosely documenting 
the praises of what the Keck funds had enabled them to build or sustain.35 The 
29. See Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching 
Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LeGal EduC. 75, 87 (1991).
30. See id. at 90.
31. See James Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools:  Replacing Lost Benefits of the 
Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 u. Cin. l. rev. 83, 91 (1991)
32. Thomas B. Metzloff & David B. Wilkins, Foreword, 58 law and Contemp. problems 1, 1 
(1995).
33. Writing in 1991, James Moliterno summarized the rival methods of instruction that were then 
common as “lecture, problem-based discussion, case-opinion based discussion, example 
(including lawyer case studies and faculty or supervisor role modeling), and role-sensitive 
representation activity (including both client and simulated client representation).”, supra 
note 32, at 105.
34. One appeared in volume 58 of law and Contemporary problems, the other two in volumes 
38 and 39 of the wm. & mary l. rev.
35. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 Wm. & Mary L. 
rev. 409 (1998) (the problem method); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories 
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Keck-supported literature also saw interesting discussion about expanding 
the range of materials for teaching legal ethics and professionalism beyond 
the usual law school fare of rules and judicial opinions. Instructors using film 
clips, fiction, and oral histories of prominent lawyers claimed effectiveness in 
stimulating reflection on what it means to be an ethical professional in the law.
One emerging theme in this literature was that the prevailing pedagogy 
of ethics and professionalism was attending too much to the rules of ethics 
and not enough to the developing moral perception and other non-cognitive 
contributors to an ethical practice of law. Like the rest of the law school 
curriculum, this critique went, the standard approach to ethics instruction 
privileged rules and reason to the detriment or exclusion of feelings, “personal 
relationships, personal values, and personal morality.”36 In its fixation on the 
formal rules constraining lawyer behavior, it avoided deeper and more personal 
questions about developing moral responsibility and moral perception37 and 
about “engag[ing] clients in moral conversations about the lawyers’ and the 
clients’ moral responsibilities and the moral dimensions of a case.”38
The periodical literature did not return in a comprehensive way to the 
teaching of ethics and professionalism until the appearance of a symposium 
issue on “the formation of an ethical professional identity in the peer-review 
professions” in the University of St. Thomas Law Review in 2008. What had been 
the somewhat marginal theme of personal morality in the Keck-supported 
symposia of the mid-90s now moved front and center: virtually all of the 
work stipulated that “[w]ith respect to the elements of an ethical professional 
identity, ... a foundation ... is created by self-knowledge and growth of the 
moral self from narcissism toward responsibility to other people.”39 The focus 
of this symposium’s intervention in the literature was on the notion that 
professional ethics education could support “the holistic formation” of “an 
ethical professional identity” connecting technical professional skills with a 
profession’s highest purposes.40
about Clients, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 421 (1998) (clinic-based narrative method).
36. John Mixon and Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional Responsibility,” 58 law 
& Contemp. probs. 87, 91 (1996).
37. See Lisa Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics Courses:  A Dialogue 
about Goals, 39 wm. & mary l. rev. 457, 460-69 (1998). 
38. Christine Mary Vener, Encouraging Personal Responsibility—An Alternative Approach to Teaching Legal 
Ethics, 58 law & Contemp. probs. 287, 290 (1996).
39. Neil Hamilton, Foreword, The Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity in the Peer-Review Professions, 
5 u. st. tHomas l.J. 361, 363 (2008).
40. Id. at 361. A follow-up symposium published in the University of St. Thomas Law Journal in 
2011 continued the theme of considering ethics instruction in law schools as contributing to a 
process of moral and professional “formation” rather than simply instilling an understanding 
of ethical rules. See Robert K. Vischer, Foreword to Symposium on “The Lawyer’s Role and Professional 
Formation,” 9 u. st. tHomas l.J. 215 (2011) (summarizing symposium papers).
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For legal education, the most important contribution to this symposium 
came from Ann Colby and William M. Sullivan,41 both of whom had just 
wrapped up the multi-year “Preparation for the Professions” program of 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.42 That program 
carefully examined “the goals and practices of professional education in ... 
five fields,” including law, through site visits and data analysis in order to 
“understand their strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend strategies 
for improving professional preparation.”43 The Carnegie project helpfully 
identified three common “apprenticeships” in all professional education: 
an apprenticeship of knowledge, an apprenticeship of practice, and an 
apprenticeship of professional roles and responsibilities.44 In legal education, 
students acquire knowledge of the substance of the law and skill at analytical 
thinking in the first apprenticeship. In the second apprenticeship, law students 
learn the skills of law practice through clinical work, simulation exercises, 
writing courses, and the like. The third apprenticeship is where law students 
are acculturated to the “essential social purposes” of the practice of law and to 
the “ethical standards and practices, professional sensibilities, and ... sense of 
professional identity” that define the field.45
Colby and Sullivan were careful to note that in all of the professions, the 
third apprenticeship is not distinct from the first two; in some ways it arises 
from and integrates what students learn in those.46 The third is, however, 
the apprenticeship that gets the least amount of attention and cultivation in 
legal education, to the point of being “marginalized.”47 The Carnegie study 
uncovered a reason for this. The third apprenticeship is not about knowing 
the law or how to “think like a lawyer” or how to cross-examine a witness or 
how to negotiate a settlement. It is about developing the basis of a career-long 
purpose to live up to the ethical norms and highest public purposes of the 
profession itself. But the Carnegie team’s law school site visits revealed strong 
doubts among both faculty and students that “professional educators are ... 
responsible for shaping students’ ethical development, that this enterprise 
is ... legitimate, and that it is [any] longer feasible to influence the ethical 
development of students once they are young adults.”48 That, Colby and 
41. Ann Colby and William M. Sullivan, Formation of Professionalism and Purpose: Perspectives from the 
Preparation for the Professions Program, 5 u. st. tHomas l.J. 404 (2008).
42. This program produced a much-discussed report, known colloquially as “the Carnegie 
Report.” See william m. sullivan, et al, eduCatinG lawyers: preparation for tHe 
profession of law (2007).
43. Id. at 409.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 410.
46. See id. at 411.
47. See id. at 419.
48. Id. at 420. Russell G. Pearce summarizes and criticizes the view that law school comes too 
late for moral instruction in Teaching Ethics Seriously:  Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law 
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Sullivan plausibly argue, is a big part of why the apprenticeship of ethics and 
professional identity plays a marginal role in legal education.
The Carnegie study of the professions suggested another reason. Law 
schools emphasize the first apprenticeship (knowledge of the law and 
development of analytical thinking skills); their main pedagogical mode is 
that of what Colby and Sullivan call “the academy.”49 By this they mean that 
most of the instruction takes place in a conventional classroom setting that 
privileges “skepticism, intellectual rigor, and objectivity.”50 In such a setting, 
they point out, “it is not surprising that the third apprenticeship tends to be 
suspect, since it requires engagement rather than distance, and commitment 
rather than thoroughgoing skepticism.”51 Colby and Sullivan note that fields 
such as medicine and nursing, which give priority to the second apprenticeship 
(where the focus is the acquisition of professional skills), tend to take the third 
apprenticeship more seriously.52 Attention to professional identity and purpose 
is to be expected in a setting like a patient encounter, where the professional 
stakes are visceral and high.
The work of the Carnegie team significantly enriched our thinking about the 
pedagogy of legal ethics and professionalism by positioning the development 
of character at the center of a discussion that had formerly focused on conduct 
and the rules constraining it.53 In one way, however, the Carnegie approach 
slighted an important piece of the third apprenticeship. At every point where 
Colby and Sullivan speak of the third apprenticeship, they invoke a morality 
that is internal to the profession. They say, for example, that the apprenticeship 
“is meant to capture students’ induction into the field’s ethical standards and 
practices, professional sensibilities, appreciation for and commitment to the 
field’s essential social purposes, and sense of professional identity in which 
those purposes and standards are experienced as core features of what it means 
to practice that profession.”54 They argue that the third apprenticeship must 
help students develop “[h]abits of interpretation or salience through which 
complex situations are understood and framed at least in part in moral terms, 
that is, in terms of the field’s purposes and standards.”55
What this focus on role morality misses, of course, is the tension between 
role morality and ordinary morality. A lawyer exclusively focused on acting 
School, 29 loy. u. CHi. l. J. 719, 732-35 (1998).
49. Colby & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 420.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 421.
53. It must be noted that the Carnegie Report was not without its critics. See W. Bradley 
Wendel, Should Law Schools Teach Professional Duties, Professional Virtues, or Something Else? A Critique of 
the Carnegie Report on Educating Lawyers, 9 u. st. tHomas l. rev. 497 (2011).
54. Colby & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 410 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
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in role might blind himself to contexts in which role morality deviates from 
other moral structures, including his own personal code. It is not enough 
for a professional to commit herself to “the field’s purposes and standards;” 
she must also learn to look for contexts in which commitment to “the field’s 
purposes and standards” might lead her astray. After all, those “purposes 
and standards” tend to reward zeal in an advocate and to celebrate lawyerly 
cleverness. These features are not deviations from what Colby and Sullivan 
call “the profession’s social ends and civic foundations”56 or its “public 
purpose;”57 they are among its basic methods. They are building blocks of its 
institutions. It is therefore practically inevitable that a single-minded focus on 
the field’s purposes and standards will risk endorsement of too much zeal58 and 
too much cleverness,59 or at least fail to train students to be on the lookout for 
an excess of those things, in themselves and in others. What is needed in the 
third apprenticeship is not just a focus on the role behaviors that are prized by 
legal institutions but also a challenge to what Parker Palmer calls “the myth 
that institutions are external to us and constrain us.”60 It must remind students 
of “all of the ways in which [lawyers] co-create institutional pathologies”61 that 
can lead the profession to condone or approve what is morally troubling or 
even unconscionable.62
The risk of relying too exclusively on the legal profession’s own account of 
itself in ethics education is revealed in a vignette from my home institution, the 
University of North Carolina School of Law. Some twenty years ago, the school 
offered a course designed to teach law students ethics and professionalism 
through the methods of oral history.63 Students were trained in interviewing 
techniques and then sent out to interview local “lawyers and judges who [were] 
living lives dedicated to a higher purpose, who love[d] what they [were] doing, 
56. Id. at 406.
57. Id. at 426.
58. Colby and Sullivan acknowledge this risk, though they too unreflectively characterize 
excessive zeal—“the attorney as hired gun”—as a “deviation[ ] from ethical practice” rather 
than as a byproduct of it. See id. at 418-19.
59. Cf. William Damon, et al., Passion & Mastery in Balance: Toward Good Work in the Professions, 134 
daedalus, no. 3, 27, 31 (2005) (noting “the sheer delight of intellectual virtuosity as an 
end in itself” that can develop among law students in the latter part of their professional 
education).
60. Parker J. Palmer, A New Professional: The Aims of Education Revisited, 29 CHanGe 6, 9 (Nov-Dec 
2007).
61. Id.
62. See generally David Luban, Stevens’s Professionalism and Ours, 38 wm. & mary l. rev. 297, 315 
(1996).
63. See Walter H. Bennett, Jr., The University of North Carolina Intergenerational Legal Ethics Project: 
Expanding the Contexts for Teaching Professional Ethics and Values, 58 law and Contemp. probs. 173 
(1995).
397
and who [found] intellectual richness and creativity in lawyers’ work.”64 In the 
words of the course’s creator, these were lawyers who were “proud of being 
members of the profession, who [felt] that being a lawyer involves a deep 
moral commitment, that it is a position not only of prestige but of honor.”65 
This creative approach to teaching ethics and professionalism had the virtue 
of engaging students in a far more personal kind of study than what goes on in 
the typical classroom. It sought to “reconnect[ ] issues of professional values 
to questions of personal and societal morality ... by encouraging students to 
view lawyers not only as professionals, but as individuals and members of their 
communities.”66
The journal article introducing this innovative course to the larger 
community of legal educators opened with a quotation from one of the course’s 
oral history subjects, the late Judge Frank W. Snepp of the Mecklenburg 
County Superior Court. This epigraph seemed to sum up the rationale for 
the course itself while also portraying Judge Snepp as just the sort of seasoned 
ethical expert to inspire law students to reach for a higher level:
I think the ethical tone of the Bar has dropped way below what’s acceptable.... 
If a lawyer doesn’t know an ethical problem when it confronts him, that’s the 
problem. They don’t know whether they’ve got an ethical problem. They just 
barge ahead. And if you haven’t got that gut feeling, “wait a minute here, 
there’s something here,” and look into it, they can give you all the courses in 
the world. It’s not going to give you that.67
The idea that students might begin to develop that “gut sense” through 
sustained personal contact with a luminary like Judge Snepp was novel and 
worthwhile.
On careful examination, though, Judge Snepp was a troubling role model. 
In the early 1970s, Snepp had presided over a notorious criminal trial that 
emblematized the lid of repression that southern whites tried to force over black 
political activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The case of “the Charlotte 
Three” was a prosecution of young black political activists for allegedly burning 
down a horse stable from which one of them had been barred on account of 
his race. Though the evidence was thin and the trial marred by prosecutorial 
misconduct, the nearly all-white jury that Judge Snepp empaneled convicted 
all three of them and the judge sentenced them to terms of as long as 25 years’ 
imprisonment, by far the harshest sentences for arson in anyone’s memory and 
longer even than those for fires that claimed human life.68
64. walter bennett, tHe lawyer’s mytH: revivinG ideals in tHe leGal profession 6 (2001).
65.  Id.
66. Bennett, supra note 63, at 191.
67. Id. at 173 (quoting Frank W. Snepp).
68. See Heather Ann Thompson, All Across the Nation: Urban Black Activism, North and South, 1965-1957, 
in afriCan ameriCan urban History sinCe world war ii 194-201 (Kenneth L. Kusmer 
& Joe W. Trotter eds., 2009). In the new york times, Tom Wicker editorialized critically 
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The case of the Charlotte Three and the brutality of its outcome did not give 
a misleading impression of Judge Snepp’s views on race or judicial demeanor. 
His UNC oral history—the oral history from which the epigraph was drawn—is 
full of bigoted and dismissive quips about minority groups.69 In addition, it 
was also no secret that Judge Snepp comported himself bluntly, even brutally, 
from the bench. An Associated Press profile described him as what we might 
today call a bully, a judge “known for his quick wit, short fuse and sharp tongue” 
who “[f]or 22 years ... ha[d] scowled—sometimes red-faced—from behind the 
bench.”70 Lawyers who had appeared before him called him “a high-pressure 
hose that gets loose” and a judge who “reduces lawyers to jelly.”71 Even those 
lawyers who praised him described the judge as “too impatient, hot-tempered, 
abrasive and quick to make up his mind.”72
The purpose of this brief profile of Judge Snepp is not to demonize him. 
Although his courtroom manner was intemperate, his social views were surely 
shared by other white southern men of his socioeconomic class and generation. 
The point is rather to highlight that a law school program seeking to connect 
students in the 1990s with prominent exemplars of professionalism identified 
Judge Snepp as an appropriate candidate and his “gut feeling” as a fitting 
epigraph for the program itself.73
about the case to a national readership, calling Judge Snepp’s sentences “unusually harsh 
even by the standards of the law-and-order atmosphere of the Nixon years.” Tom Wicker, 
Law and Vengeance, n.y. times, Dec. 27, 1974, at 31.
69. Interview with Judge Frank Snepp, Law School Oral History Project, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (Feb. 25, 1993) (on file in the Southern Oral History Program 
Collection at the Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Special 
Collections Library, UNC-Chapel Hill). Snepp complained that the nation had become 
“polyglot,” id. at 17, full of “strangers, Hispanics, [and] Haitians” who no longer wanted to 
be “Americanized.” Id. at 21. He recalled an era in in New York City when “[t]here were a 
lot of black people, but you never were afraid of being mugged,” id. at 23, and spoke of the 
“type of black” a lawyer might want on a jury. Id. at 67. He said it was a “dangerous thing” 
that the owner of a baseball team should have to go to a sensitivity training class because she 
said “nigger.” Id. at 26. He told the law student interviewing him that for fear of contracting 
AIDS, he would not assist a gay person who had been shot. Id. at 25. He called lawyers Jews 
in contexts where that was irrelevant, id. at 65, and caricatured Jews as quick with arbitrary 
assertions of anti-Semitism. Id. at 25. He contrasted the “Asians who ... will work” and learn 
to speak English with others who would not. Id. at 22. He blamed feminism for having left 
teenagers without a parent to look after them, leading them to murder people. Id. at 27. As 
for the 25-year sentence he imposed in the Charlotte Three case for the fire that killed horses 
but no humans, Judge Snepp was mystified by the critical public reaction: “You would have 
thought I had them flogged in the public square.” Id. at 65. 
70. Colorful Judge Steps Down after 22 Years, wilminGton (nC) star-news, Aug. 14, 1989, at 23.
71. Id. 
72. Id.
73. It is worth noting that Judge Snepp’s interviewer did not question him about any of the 
troubling aspects of his career or temperament, or about any of the disturbing views about 
race, ethnicity, and religion that he voiced during the interview.
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The legal profession, like all professions, wants to lionize its luminaries and 
elders as wise and heroic. It wants to hold up an icon like John W. Davis as 
a “paragon of virtue and rectitude and [a] conscience of the community”74 
without accounting for the fact that Davis chose to devote his full energies to 
the defense of American racial apartheid, not just early in his career but at its 
end, when the moral horrors of that system were becoming apparent to lawyers 
all over the country.75 The profession wants to venerate a powerful lawyer like 
John J. McCloy as a “lawyer-statesman”76 without grappling with McCloy’s 
role as an architect of the wartime legal system that uprooted and imprisoned 
tens of thousands of American citizens without charges of wrongdoing, on 
the basis of nothing more than their parents’ country of origin.77 To be sure, 
judges like Frank Snepp and lawyers like John Davis and John McCloy might 
serve as useful examples in the professional development of attorneys, but the 
example could be of something nuanced rather than noble—the power that 
lawyers have to do great harm in the name of, rather than in violation of, their 
professional ethos.
In summary, over several decades, the literature has suggested a number 
of strategies for supplementing and improving instruction in legal ethics and 
professionalism in American law schools—strategies that not every instructor 
embraces but that nonetheless enjoy broad acceptance. Students should have 
the chance to learn through experience rather than just through reading and 
Socratic dialogue. Students should engage with a wider range of learning 
materials than rules and cases, and these should include narratives—both 
fictional and real—about lawyers’ lives. Students should be encouraged, 
even expected, to raise their sights above the rules of professional conduct 
and examine deeper and more ambiguous issues of emotional and moral 
development. Students should learn to appreciate the lawyer’s role morality 
within a broader moral framework that will allow her to see when acting in 
role carries danger. Students should be offered an apprenticeship to carry 
them past the acquisition of substantive knowledge and practical skill toward 
a career-long appreciation of the tremendous responsibility lawyers have for 
the welfare of others.
The FASPE program presents one way of addressing some of these 
needs. By harnessing the power of place, the FASPE fellowship provides an 
immersive learning experience that compels each fellow to confront emotional 
74. bennett, supra note 64, at 39.
75. See id. at 47-50. Walter Bennett allows that by the end of the twentieth century, Davis’s 
professional life might not serve as an inspiring example for “a young African-American 
lawyer.” Id. at 76. He does not suggest, though, that Davis’s defense of racial apartheid 
would impair Davis’s reputation in the eyes of lawyers today who are not young and black, 
and he argues that Davis’s career choices were proper in their historical context even if they 
look unpalatable today. See id. at 76-77.
76. antHony kronman, tHe lost lawyer 11 (1993).
77. See Susan P. Koniak & Roger C. Cramton, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 
38 wm. & mary l. rev. 145, 196-97 (1996) (criticizing Kronman’s veneration of McCloy). 
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evidence of the degradation and violence in a system of law created and 
managed by legal professionals. This happens not only at a wild and barbaric 
site like Auschwitz, where the most extreme violence was practiced, but also at 
a refined and elegant site like the House of the Wannsee Conference, where, 
as noted at the outset, the perpetrators were mostly lawyers. These settings 
disrupt the fellows’ understanding of legal ethics and professionalism, shifting 
it to a more emotional plane.
FASPE also supplies the fellows with a wider variety of learning materials 
than is common in a law school course on ethics and professionalism. Of 
course, the physical sites themselves become learning materials; this is another 
way of describing the impact of the power of place. But the curriculum also 
includes various narrative depictions of lawyers and others making decisions 
with grave ethical ramifications—films showing lawyers deciding upon the 
deaths of millions and experimental subjects deciding whether to administer 
electrical shocks to an innocent person. It includes a case study of Bernhard 
Lösener, the perplexing Nazi lawyer mentioned earlier,78 who can plausibly be 
seen as both a builder of and a brake on the engine of the persecution of Jews 
through the 1930s and who abandoned his post when no longer able to claim 
ignorance of the reality of genocide. It includes a face-to-face meeting with a 
survivor of Auschwitz and Birkenau who narrates the tragedies that befell her 
and her family.
This last narrative reveals another unique aspect of FASPE’s approach to 
ethics and professionalism:  it gives a prominent place not just to lawyers but 
also to the people harmed by lawyers. This is the central reason for the visit 
to Auschwitz and Birkenau on the FASPE trip. The FASPE fellows spend 
time in Germany, walking in the footsteps of the Nazi lawyers and trying to 
imagine their mindsets and motivations, but then travel to the killing fields 
in Poland to confront the human impact of what those lawyers did. It is 
an opportunity for the fellows to imagine themselves into the lives of those 
touched (and destroyed) by lawyers’ power. Including the experiences of 
victims distinguishes FASPE’s approach to legal ethics from those common in 
law school curricula, which focus chiefly on lawyers and the rules constraining 
them.
Another distinction should be obvious but nonetheless bears mention. 
FASPE teaches chiefly by negative example. It abandons the heroic narrative 
of an Atticus Finch or a Thurgood Marshall (not to mention the falsely heroic 
narrative of a Frank Snepp) in favor of the tortured and torturing narrative 
of a Bernhard Lösener. The point of looking so unflinchingly into the face of 
evil is not to scare the fellows straight. FASPE does not cast all Nazi lawyers 
as unrecognizable moral monsters. Rather, it invites the fellows to find in a 
character like Bernhard Lösener traces of themselves: ambition, cleverness, 
competitiveness, patriotism, acceptance of the status quo. It rejects the trite 
and mistaken depiction of the Nazi legal system as a mere veneer of legality 
shielding a wholly corrupt and lawless interior, emphasizing instead the 
78. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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numerous points of connection between the Nazi legal system and the legal 
system of the Weimar Republic that preceded it—as well as the legal systems 
of other nations, including our own.79 The FASPE fellow looks into the face 
of evil to see, in certain moments, her own resemblance. This is uncomfortable 
work, rather distinct from the cheerful hope that law students will be inspired 
to live and practice ethically through exposure to the stories of heroes, lawyer-
statesmen, and pillars of the community.80
A final distinction between FASPE and the common legal ethics course in a 
law school classroom is that FASPE is completely immersive. From the moment 
the FASPE fellows arrive in New York, they are together (with each other, and, 
to a great extent, with faculty and staff) for twelve straight days. These are 
days not just of seminar study but of travel, meals, jet lag, entertainment, co-
rooming, and sightseeing. Friendships form; at moments they also fray. People 
move from resilience to vulnerability and back again on their own timetables. 
There are tears, and there is laughter. FASPE is, in other words, something of 
a cocoon that forms around the fellows to permit them the intense reflection 
and personal engagement that stimulates personal and moral growth. It is safe 
to say that the program of legal education at no American law school could 
afford to create such an opportunity for its students, as a matter of either time 
or funding.
This is not to say, however, that FASPE’s approach to ethics and professional 
formation has no place in American legal education. Americans need not travel 
overseas to confront sites of great human suffering designed and defended 
by lawyers. American law and American lawyers created and nourished the 
plantation economy and protected the slave trade.81 Those sites of suffering 
remain. American law and American lawyers created and defended the legal 
structures that exiled and imprisoned American Indians and attacked and 
undermined their cultures.82 Those sites of suffering remain. American law 
and American lawyers designed and defended the uprooting and incarceration 
of tens of thousands of Japanese Americans in camps during World War II.83 
Those sites of suffering remain. For every heroic lawyer defending a lunch 
79. Though it is uncomfortable for Americans to acknowledge this, laws enforcing racial 
supremacy and separation and laws authorizing eugenic sterilization were common in the 
United States in the mid-1930s, much as they were in Germany. See david fraser, law 
after ausCHwitZ 95-97, 107-17 (2005).
80. I do not mean to suggest that FASPE is alone in the idea that students can profit from 
studying lawyers who do wrong. Richard Abel’s excellent lawyers in tHe doCk:  learninG 
from attorney disCiplinary proCeedinGs (2008) takes a similar approach, though the 
lawyer conduct catalogued in Abel’s book does not approach the evil of the Nazi system.
81. See robert Cover, JustiCe aCCused (1975); slavery and tHe law (Paul Finkelman ed., 
1997); Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 n.C. l. rev. 757 (2009).
82. See tim alan Garrison, tHe leGal ideoloGy of removal, tHe soutHern JudiCiary and 
tHe sovereiGnty of native ameriCan nations (2009).
83. See peter irons, JustiCe at war (1983); Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 
n.C. l. rev. 1333 (2010).
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counter protester of Jim Crow, there was a network of laws and lawyers 
prosecuting and persecuting him.84 Those sites of suffering remain.
At many American law schools, it is possible to visit such a site for the cost 
of a bus or a train ticket, and at others for the cost of a domestic plane ticket. 
Some such sites—plantation slave quarters, or a Woolworth lunch counter85 that 
company lawyers fought to keep segregated—would speak with unmistakable 
clarity. Others—the grassland where once stood an internment camp or the 
halls of an historic courtroom—would require the assistance of an historical 
interpreter to make them speak, but such interpreters abound, sometimes as 
nearby as the halls of a campus history department. While FASPE supports 
twelve days of isolation and immersion, a powerful group dynamic could surely 
take hold in a shorter time, perhaps even a Spring Break trip or even a four-
day weekend. FASPE is admittedly costly, but if the American bar is serious 
in its concern for the decline of professionalism, law firms might be persuaded 
to help fund a powerful program fostering moral and ethical reflection and 
formation.
The approach of FASPE should not and will not replace the more 
conventional methods of instruction in ethics and professionalism in American 
law school classrooms. It does, however, show how some of the holes in the 
standard curriculum might be filled, thereby helping the discipline renew 
its commitment not just to educating law students about conduct rules but 
launching them on a lifelong path of moral professional formation.
84. See anders walker, tHe GHost of Jim Crow:  How soutHern moderates used brown 
v. board of eduCation to stall Civil riGHts (2009); david J. mays, raCe reason, and 
massive resistanCe: tHe diary of david J. mays, 1954-1959 (2008); Clive wHite, rabble 
rousers:  tHe ameriCan far riGHt in tHe Civil riGHts era (2011).
85. I refer to the lunch counter beautifully preserved and interpreted at the International Civil 
Rights Center and Museum in Greensboro, North Carolina.
